Asleep at the Switch
Wow! We are still talking about and mourning the nine firefighters killed in a South Carolina building collapse. There is truly nothing new under the sun.
Here’s what we already knew from 200 years of firefighters dying unnecessarily in America:
- Certain construction is prone to earlier collapse.
- Truss roofs kill.
- Fire load contributes to failing structural members.
After approximately 20 minutes, if firefighters haven’t darkened the fire down significantly, officers should consider pulling all personnel out from the interior of the building and have them fight the fire defensively from outside the collapse zone. If your assessment at the 20-minute mark indicates a high probability that the structural integrity will remain, then continue with firefighting operations, as required. There are certain construction types should have officers thinking, “we are going to wash this one down the street in six hours, but we should still be committed to taking everyone of our firefighters home at the end of this thing.”
Remember that the term for fuel (the structure) in the fire tetrahedron is “reducing agent.” If structural members are being reduced (consumed), why are we surprised when the building falls down? The media and really poor fire officers always say tragedies were “without warning.” We’ve been warned for the past 200 years, only some of us aren’t listening.
A primary search in an unsprinklered, high-piled rack storage furniture store can’t last an hour in any community on the planet. I fear that an entire system of fire response was asleep at the switch!
I will refuse to add the words “brave” or “hero” to the nine killed in Charleston. They were innocent victims. This was fratricide — brother killing brother — in another death by friendly fire. When are we going to stop the madness and senselessness of these preventable deaths? This is a public health emergency. The occupational death of one worker every three days is unacceptable in every profession but ours. The rest of the world gets it. They value their firefighters and any firefighter death is a national tragedy.
We just yawn and call them “brave heros.” Then we add insult to injury by putting stick-on letters on the back window of pick-up trucks in commemoration. Where is the outrage from the fire service? I know. Let’s add a bullet to next year’s safety standdown. That ought to help.







October 9th, 2007 at 3:45 pm
Lindstrom, I admire your courage to say what many have been thinking for many years! I first heard Dr. Burt Clark sound the clarion at the EFO Graduate Symposium a couple of years ago: we must change our culture to keep our firefighters from dying. I’m paraphrasing here, but Dr. Clark said, “We must change a culture that “rewards” a firefighter with a hero’s funeral for getting themselves killed because they didn’t buckle their seat belt.”
Change our culture, change the statistics.
October 10th, 2007 at 9:17 am
I applaud you for saying what many in Charleston are already feeling.
What can mere citizens do to help?
Most wonderful article !
October 10th, 2007 at 3:36 pm
John, I applaud the sentiments expressed in your article, but feel compelled to take issue with two points:
1. The 20-minute rule-of-thumb you cite can cause as many or more problems than it solves. We would do well to encourage more precision in our use of terms for describing fires involving buildings and avoid oversimplifications that may or may not conform to the laws of physics. We should be looking to orient our thinking to the difference between three types of fires:
a. Fires involving contents that remain controlled or regulated by the form, type, geometry, quantity, location, and configuration of the fuels involved AND which have not yet grown large enough to attack or transfer heat to the structural components of the building.
b. Fires involving building contents that have become controlled by the availability of oxygen (or an oxidizing agent), BUT which have not yet exposed or attacked structural components of the building.
c. Fires, regardless of size or condition, which have begun to attack or transfer heat to the structural system or components of the building.
Each of these situations requires different strategies and tactics. Uncertainty concerning which situation exists should suggest urgency and caution.
2. The victims of the Charleston disaster may or may not be innocent. We can no more afford to hold only those in authority to account than we can afford to diminish or dismiss the responsibility of those on the frontlines to apply safe practices and refuse unsafe orders.
We can build a lasting memorial to these firefighters by avoiding all oversimplifications besides one: Everyone is responsible for safety. Let’s remember these fallen firefighters by requiring everyone to accept personal responsibility and holding one another to account for safety at all times.
October 10th, 2007 at 10:24 pm
Abusing the memory of those that died, is not only callous, but will hinder the message you were trying to spread. It’s akin to saying that every firefighter that goes into a burning building has a death wish, rather than a wish to help.
You want to target someone, target the leadership…it is they who failed to properly train, equip, and lead their men. They are the ones’ responsible.
Kiwichief: How dare you accuse the men of not doing their job to the best of their ability. Maybe you should do your research on South Carolina and realize that this is a right to work state…which means a chief can fire you if he doesn’t like the way you look at him (can you imagine if you ignore an order?) and not have to explain it to anybody. Because of that, the union has no real power here. It’s all about who you know, not what you know.
That is why you don’t hear any firefighter speaking out publicly. They are also under gag order, producing a climate of fear and intimidation. Chiefs have sat in on interviewing session with any of the agencies that have been investigating.
It sure is easy to pass judgment from where you are on the 9 that died, and those left behind when your career and livelyhood isn’t on the line.
Therefore, the blame lies fully on the leadership, since they are the only ones wielding the power. And they are the ones resisting the change. So you tell me, what would you do? It’s real easy to say the CFD should change, but making it happen is out of the power of those below the level of chief.
October 13th, 2007 at 11:50 am
John, I believe you are correct in some respects, but the 20-minute rule may or may be applicable. Twenty minutes may be too long at some fires. Although periodic condition and personnel acountability reports are a good starting point more is needed.
Number one, the incident command system is absolutely necessary. Number two, strategic placement of command officers, where they can observe and REPORT developing conditions is critical. And third, all personnell operating on the fire ground must be AUTHORIZED and REQUIRED to REPORT deteriorating conditions or safety concerns up the line to decision makers. This last necessity is a culture issue, as well as a training issue. It is up to the fire chief to instill this culture in his department. Even with the best intentions, command officers need input from the interior. I don’t know of any chiefs who have x-ray vision. Conversly, interior fifighters can not be aware of conditions outside their field of vision (if they even have one).
Building familiarization and pre-planning are starting points, but communication among the fire fighting forces is paramount.
December 11th, 2007 at 2:30 pm
Gary and Kiwi–you’re both right about the 20 minute rule. There is nothing magic about that number. My point is that most incompetent fire officers are not cognisant of any reassessment of fire conditions as a benchmark to change strategy after initial setup and interior fire attack operations. The “20 minute” rule is a bench mark to keep the primary search from going on indefinitiely. I prefer the approach of continuous mental evaluation and maintaining situational awareness which drive tactics, but I see that very rarely among those that attend fires infrequently. If you applied the 20 minute rule to the vast majority of firefighter fatalities involving collapse-you would reduce the number killed by 80%. Thats not a bad start and it’s easy to teach and remember.
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