As a still-grieving Charleston, S.C., prepares for a memorial next month to honor the nine firefighters who died last year, the analysis and fallout continue.
Last week, the National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health released its draft report on the fire. Earlier this week, Chief Rusty Thomas retired. And yesterday, the Charleston Post-Incident Assessment and Enhancement Review Team released its comprehensive Phase 2 report, with minute details on the deaths of the nine firefighters.
The task force reviewed its analysis of the deadly fire with the fallen firefighters’ immediate-family members, then with a second group of family members. It followed those reviews with a meeting with Charleston firefighters and later with the Charleston city council.
What makes the task force report different from NIOSH’s 55-page draft released last week? The NIOSH draft report is an attempt to reconstruct the fire’s timeline and the fire department’s on-scene activities.
The task force’s in-depth 272-page report includes a timeline, radio transmissions and documentation to support proper procedures. This report also specifies errors and omissions. It is a very difficult and emotional read, especially for anyone with knowledge of the fire service.
The report makes one thing clear — the events leading to these firefighter deaths started long before June 18, 2007. But when did it all start?
Did it begin with cockiness after being awarded an Insurance Service Office Class 1 rating in 1998? Did the “first class” status allow the fire department to rest on its laurels, even though that status applied only to a small portion of Charleston’s response area? Even the mayor referred to Charleston’s “first-class department.”
Did the lack of systematic fire inspections allow the Sofa Super Store to connect new buildings and avoid installing required fire sprinklers?
Which is at greater fault: the water department that removed a hydrant in 2004 or the fire department that failed to update its response plans accordingly?
Was assigning battalion chiefs to act as “safety officers” a sufficient replacement for a trained, designated safety officer?
Perhaps it began when the city’s financial department tightened the budgets, which restricted personnel from traveling to conferences and training programs. Did that cause the lack of officer development programs? Did budgets prohibit the purchase of NFPA-compliant stationwear? That stationwear, along with new PPE and breathing apparatus, are available now, following the recommendations in the Phase 1 report.
The Firefighter Fatality Investigative Report is a must-read for every firefighter, officer and fire chief. There are lessons to be learned from these nine courageous men who died after a long series of errors and omissions. This report also should be mandatory reading for local government officials who need a lesson in the real-life consequences of budget cuts.
Rusty Thomas was shattered when he retired from the position he lived for and loved. He gave up a job, but 11 months ago, nine of his firefighters needlessly gave up their lives, jobs and families.
Nine Charleston firefighters died needlessly on June 18, 2007. Now it’s incumbunt upon every fire department to learn from this report so that those deaths were not in vain.
May 16th, 2008 @ 11:41 am
I agree wholeheartedly with your asssessment and question, Where did all this start? Most things do not happen just yesterday, they build and build on themselves until they explode or as in this case something worse. Nine people needlessly died in an attempt to save what? Was the risk worth the actions when it came to the fire ground operations and how they were done?
Obviously not, no property is worth a life let alone 9 of them at any cost. An old mentor once told me, once it’s through the roof then lay it outside and stay that way! No building is worth the risks that were encountered that day.
As for the ISO rating, does it really mean anything. Anyone who keeps up with ISO knows that once you go below a 4 it is all just fluff and paperwork. I applaud those departments who have gone to a Class 1,but did they really prove anything more than they could pass an assessment. Departments who work hard to earn 4’s and 5’s are getting the job done just as good as a Class 1 department.
This issue boils down to lack of operational protocols and good judgement. To hear a firefighter on the radio ask for help and then hear his benediction in a prayer is nothing short of tragic.
Also, where has the City Manager been in all this? He has been markedly absent and not said one word this whole time. Is he afraid of what might be done to him? He needs to step up to the plate and tell the Mayor to handle the political issues and let him take care of mending the fire department. It is time for someone from outside the department to step up and take the job and make the needed changes and move forward.
In closing, ALL fire departments regardless of size and rating should learn from this tragic lesson and take a long hard look at how they need to work a job and keep peopl safe.
Let’s Be Carefull Out There
May 16th, 2008 @ 6:15 pm
This was the longest NIOSH report I’d ever read. It was very troubling at the least. It is sad that a department exhausted that much research, training and finance to achieve a Level 1 status, and they didn’t follow through. The end result was death, and that is not tolerable. I believe that the Fire Chief truly loved the service but, because of the lack of disciplined leadership, there is obviously time for change. It was further troubling, and I have seen this with other departments, to mimic daily routine with what the department does but are not honest in what they do. Example was, during the ISO rating test, every apparatus had 4 firefighters aboard. 50% of the testing is available manpower on scene within a specified time period. The day of the incident, every apparatus from that department only had 3 (except for the neighboring fire department which did have 4; as I understand). To achieve such a high ISO status is exemplary and rewarding to a department and its community . However, departments are not using normal daily manpower and/or apparatus during such tests. I have even heard of departments loaning a ladder or other apparatus to a neighboring department to help them achieve a higher ISO rating, only to find that a pop inspection from the ISO agency to find those pieces of apparatus not available, and losing their ISO rating. They would have kept their rating had that piece of equipment been at station. Fire Departments are suppose to be honest, why are they not in this instance. There also seemed to be a lot of free-lance firefighting going on and no pattern used during suppression and/or primary/secondary searches. It is time. Fire departments across the country need to have a more disaplined and adequate staffing. Communities need to make sure that these firefighters have the necessary arsenal on scene, or enroute at the least, to assist a firefighter in a “Mayday” situation. The 2 in, 2 out rule is a very good rule to follow, but seemed to be lacking here. My heart goes out to the fellow firefighters of that, and surrounding, department(s) and to the families that have suffered such a great loss. There was truely a lot to be learned. Glen D. Borror, Asst. Chief-ret.
May 18th, 2008 @ 9:25 am
Once again, Janet, your comments are timely, relevant, and have a great sense of urgency. Let us hope that these lessons are taken to heart and learned well, not only by those in the fire service, but also the people in local, state, and federal government who seem to forget about the needs of the fire service until the next needless loss of a firefighter’s life.